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ABSTRACT 
 
 In Samantar v. Yousuf, the U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA) does not govern the immunity of foreign officials from 
legal proceedings in U.S. courts. Part I of this symposium 
contribution seeks to put in sharper focus exactly what is, and 
what is not, in dispute following Samantar. Part II presents 
three challenges to common assumptions about conduct-based 
immunity, which I consider under the headings of personal 
responsibility, penalties, and presence. Under the heading of 
personal responsibility, I emphasize that state responsibility 
and individual responsibility are not mutually exclusive. Under 
penalties, I argue that civil immunity and criminal immunity 
are not fundamentally distinct. Under presence, I emphasize 
that a defendant who enters the forum state’s territory might 
justifiably have a weaker claim to conduct-based immunity than 
one who does not. Part III suggests some factors that should 
guide lower courts in determining an individual defendant’s 
entitlement to immunity going forward.  
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 The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Samantar v. Yousuf 
vindicated the U.S. government’s consistent position that current or 
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former foreign officials cannot claim immunity under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).1 Under Samantar, individual 
official immunity (as opposed to state immunity) is a matter of 
common law, and is not necessarily commensurate with the immunity 
of the state.2 It now falls to the lower courts to define the role of the 
Executive and the precise contours of official immunity.  
 Part I of this contribution seeks to put in sharper focus exactly 
what is, and what is not, in dispute following Samantar. Even outside 
the FSIA, most individual immunity claims will fall into well-
recognized categories of immunity (or lack thereof), and thus present 
fairly straightforward questions for adjudication. That said, it is 
precisely the few remaining contentious claims that pose the 
thorniest questions, because they implicate competing concerns for 
ensuring individual accountability and providing a forum for victims 
(which push towards less immunity), and avoiding foreign relations 
conflicts and protecting U.S. officials from legal proceedings in foreign 
courts (which push towards greater immunity).3 
 Part II presents three challenges to common assumptions about 
conduct-based immunity,4 which I consider under the headings of 
personal responsibility, penalties, and presence. Under the heading of 
personal responsibility, I emphasize that state responsibility and 
individual responsibility are not mutually exclusive. This pushes 
against the view that the only relevant question for determining an 
individual’s entitlement to conduct-based immunity is whether the 
                                                                                                                      
 1.  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 
(2006). For the U.S. government’s position on the scope of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act (FSIA), see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Affirmance, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08-1555) [hereinafter United 
States Samantar Amicus Brief]; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Affirmance, Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 07-2579-cv) 
[hereinafter United States Matar Amicus Brief]; Statement of Interest of the United 
States, Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 05 Civ. 10270); 
Statement of Interest of the United States, Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 734 F. 
Supp. 415 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 86-2255). 
 2. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2290 (2010). 
 3. Although the principles governing immunity of foreign officials in U.S. 
courts will not necessarily be applied by foreign courts adjudicating the immunity of 
U.S. officials, one can anticipate that foreign courts will reference U.S. practice in 
establishing their own standards.  
 4. For more on the distinction between status-based and conduct-based 
immunity, see Chimène I. Keitner, Annotated Brief of Professors of Public International 
Law and Comparative Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents in Samantar v. 
Yousuf 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 609, 620–22 (2011) [hereinafter Keitner, Annotated 
Brief]; Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 14 GREEN 
BAG 2D 61, 62–68 (2010) [hereinafter Keitner, Common Law]; Chimène I. Keitner, 
Officially Immune? A Response to Bradley and Goldsmith, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 
1, 8–9 (2010) [hereinafter Keitner, Officially Immune?]. 
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alleged conduct is attributable to the foreign state.5 Briefly stated, 
conduct that is not attributable to the foreign state does not benefit 
from immunity. Conduct that is solely attributable to the foreign 
state and does not entail personal responsibility does benefit from 
immunity.6 Conduct that entails both personal and state 
responsibility might or might not benefit from immunity, depending 
on other relevant factors. 
 The principle that certain conduct can entail both personal and 
state responsibility is most evident in international criminal law, 
which regularly imposes legal consequences on individuals for 
conduct performed on behalf of the state.7 This principle is also 
reflected in national prosecutions for international crimes, which can 
be accompanied in some legal systems by claims for civil damages by 
parties civiles.8 The current predominance of criminal penalties, as 
opposed to civil penalties, for individuals alleged to have engaged in 
internationally wrongful conduct has led some to treat civil and 
criminal penalties as though they were fundamentally distinct.9 
However, if a central concern of contemporary immunity doctrines is 
to preclude one country’s courts from adjudicating the lawfulness of 
another country’s conduct, then there seems to be little conceptual 
difference between civil and criminal penalties, even though there 
might be practical differences in the initiation and conduct of 
proceedings. I discuss the implications of this observation in the 
section on penalties. 
 The idea of presence highlights the difference between cases 
involving defendants who remain outside the territorial jurisdiction of 
the forum state, and those involving defendants who have entered the 
                                                                                                                      
 5. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur, Second Report on Immunity of State Officials 
from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/631 
(June 10, 2010) (by Roman A. Kolodkin) (“[It is] right to use the criterion of the 
attribution to the State of the conduct of an official in order to determine whether the 
official has immunity ratione materiae and the scope of such immunity.”). 
 6. Rosanne van Alebeek also distinguishes a category of conduct that is solely 
attributable to the foreign state in her study of this topic. ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE 
IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2008).  
 7. To illustrate this principle, one need think only of the crimes perpetrated 
with state authority by individuals who were part of the Nazi government in Germany 
during World War II. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Oct. 6, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (establishing jurisdiction over such crimes). 
 8. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW STORIES 45, 71 n.110 (John A. Noyes et al. eds., 2007) (enumerating domestic 
statutes). 
 9. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Jewish Congress in Support 
of Petitioner at 5, 7–8, 42–46, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555) 
(indicating lack of immunity from criminal proceedings but arguing for immunity from 
civil proceedings for the same conduct); Brief of Amici Curiae of Former Attorneys 
General of the United States in Support of Petitioner at 17–18, Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 
2278 (No. 08-1555); United States Matar Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 24. 
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forum state’s territory. When a defendant is physically present on the 
forum state’s territory, then immunity represents a waiver of the 
forum state’s plenary jurisdiction over individuals within its 
territory.10 Absent such a waiver, individuals who enter U.S. territory 
are subject to the plenary jurisdiction of U.S. courts.11  
 Finally, Part III suggests criteria that should guide lower courts 
in determining an individual defendant’s entitlement to conduct-
based immunity. The Executive has currently declined to formulate 
bright-line rules, although it has articulated a non-exhaustive list of 
potentially relevant factors.12 If the Executive offers guidance in the 
form of a suggestion of immunity, the court should give such a 
suggestion substantial deference, particularly insofar as it conforms 
to previously articulated criteria.13 However, the ultimate goal should 
be to provide greater clarity to courts about how to weigh the legally 
relevant considerations, so that they can make principled and 
consistent determinations without executive intervention. Greater 
clarity will also put potential defendants who are not entitled to 
status-based immunity on heightened notice that traveling to, or 
residing in, the United States might come at the cost of defending 
themselves against criminal or civil proceedings in a U.S. court. 
I. TYPES OF IMMUNITY CLAIMS AFTER SAMANTAR 
 After Samantar, a current or former foreign official named as a 
defendant in a U.S. legal proceeding can raise one of four objections to 
jurisdiction based on immunity. These immunity-based objections do 
not preclude making other arguments for dismissal (such as the 
absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, or 
forum non conveniens), or raising an affirmative defense such as the 
act of state doctrine.14 In brief, the four objections are: 
 (1)  The defendant can claim status-based immunity.  
 (2)  The defendant can claim conduct-based immunity.  
                                                                                                                      
 10. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 
(1812) (clarifying that a nation’s jurisdiction within its territory is absolute and 
exceptions to that jurisdiction require the nation’s consent). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See United States Samantar Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 7, 24–26. 
 13. I have suggested elsewhere that the level of deference owed to the 
Executive is different for status-based and conduct-based immunity. See Keitner, 
Officially Immune?, supra note 4, at 3 n.15. For a more extensive discussion of the 
Executive’s current role, see Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations 
in U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915 (2011). 
 14.  For more on the act of state doctrine, see Keitner, Annotated Brief, supra 
note 4, at 614–16.  
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 (3)  The defendant can claim that a foreign state or entity is a 
required party under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 19(a)(1)(B), thus requiring 
dismissal of the case under Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel, if 
the state or entity would be immune under the FSIA.15  
 (4)  The defendant can claim that the state is the real party in 
interest by analogy to Kentucky v. Graham,16 if the relief sought 
would run directly against the state. If the state is the real party in 
interest, the claim against the individual defendant should be 
dismissed based on common law immunity or failure to name the real 
party in interest; the plaintiff might then be required to refile the 
complaint against the state itself under the FSIA, subject to equitable 
tolling.17 This option would not be available where a plaintiff sues a 
defendant “in his personal capacity and seek[s] damages from his own 
pockets.”18  
 The following three categories of defendants are generally 
entitled to claim status-based immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts under objection one above:  
 Diplomats: Diplomatic agents (that is, heads of diplomatic 
missions and members of the staff of diplomatic missions who have 
diplomatic rank) are generally immune from the criminal and civil 
jurisdiction of the receiving state under the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations.19 Other staff and household members enjoy 
lesser forms of immunity under the Vienna Convention.20 In the 
United States, the Vienna Convention has been implemented by the 
Diplomatic Relations Act,21 with the proviso that “[t]he President 
may, on the basis of reciprocity and under such terms and conditions 
as he may determine, specify [diplomatic] privileges and 
immunities . . . which result in more favorable treatment or less 
favorable treatment than is provided under the Vienna 
Convention.”22 
                                                                                                                      
 15. Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292 (citing Republic of the Philippines v. 
Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 867 (2008)). 
 16. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985). 
 17. See Keitner, Common Law, supra note 4, at 61 n.3 (noting that under the 
domestic model of official capacity suits via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the state would be the 
real party in interest where an official is sued in his or her official capacity); Keitner, 
Officially Immune?, supra note 4, at 4 (identifying circumstances in which the state, 
and not the individual, is the real party in interest). 
 18. Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2281. 
 19. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31(1), Apr. 18, 1961, 23 
U.S.T. 3227 (entered into force with respect to the United States Dec. 13, 1972). In the 
United States, this category may include certain members of UN Missions. See United 
States Headquarters Agreement, S.J. Res. 144, 80th Cong. § 15 (1947). 
 20. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 19, arts. 
37–38 (defining the privileges and immunities available to diplomatic agents’ family 
members as well as the staff and servants of the members of the diplomatic mission). 
 21. Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 254a–e (2006). 
 22. Id. § 254c. 
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 Incumbent Heads of State and Foreign Ministers: Customary 
international law provides status-based immunity for incumbent 
heads of state and foreign ministers.23 Incumbent heads of state have 
successfully claimed status-based immunity from service of process in 
the United States.24  
 Members of Special Diplomatic Missions: The United States is 
not a party to the UN Convention on Special Missions.25 However, the 
United States has previously suggested immunity from service of 
process for certain invitees of the Executive Branch under the rubric 
of “special mission immunity,”26 and it has indicated its intention to 
continue doing so where specific criteria are met.27 
 Defendants who cannot claim status-based immunity (objection 
one above) may instead claim conduct-based immunity (objection two 
above). For example, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
provides current and former consular officials with conduct-based 
immunity for acts performed in the exercise of their consular 
functions,28 and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
provides former diplomats with immunity for acts performed in the 
exercise of their functions as a member of the diplomatic mission.29  
 In sum, U.S. courts need only consider the “common law of 
official immunity”30 referred to in Samantar when a current or 
former official who is not entitled to status-based immunity, and 
whose entitlement to conduct-based immunity is not otherwise 
governed by treaty or statute, claims immunity from jurisdiction. A 
central challenge is determining the sources and content of the 
                                                                                                                      
 23. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 
3, 24 (Feb. 14).  
 24. See, e.g., Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding 
Chinese President immune from service of process based on executive suggestion of 
head of state immunity). 
 25. Convention on Special Missions, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1969, 1400 
U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force June 21, 1985); see also Status: Convention on Special 
Missions, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails. 
aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=III-9&chapter=3&lang=en#Participants 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2011).  
 26. See, e.g., Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest of the United 
States at 11 n.9, Li Weixum v. Bo Xilai, 568 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2006) (Civ. No. 04-
0649 (RJL)) (suggesting immunity from service of process for invitee of the Executive 
Branch but emphasizing that “[s]pecial mission immunity would not . . . encompass all 
foreign official travel”). 
 27. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, Keynote Address at the 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law Symposium: Foreign State Immunity at 
Home and Abroad (Feb. 4, 2011). 
 28. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations arts. 43(1), 53(4), 71(1), Apr. 
24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
 29. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 19, art. 39(2). 
 30. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2290 (2010). 
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common law principles that govern these residual, conduct-based 
immunity claims. 
II. THREE PRINCIPLES 
 In Samantar, the Supreme Court held unequivocally that the 
FSIA does not govern individual immunity claims, but it was much 
more circumspect about defining the “common law” that does govern 
such claims.31 The Executive has taken the position that the common 
law supports a historical practice of absolute deference to executive 
suggestions of immunity or, if the Executive remains silent, judicial 
application of “principles adopted by the Executive Branch, informed 
by customary international law.”32 The Executive has, at present, 
refrained from issuing an exhaustive or hierarchical list of such 
principles, and has instead committed to developing such principles 
over time.33 
 Advocates of absolute judicial deference to the Executive on 
questions of both status-based and conduct-based immunity cite the 
Court’s statement in Samantar that “[w]e have been given no reason 
to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to eliminate, 
the State Department’s role in determinations regarding individual 
official immunity.”34 However, although the Samantar Court 
described the State Department’s pre-FSIA role in suggesting 
immunity for foreign vessels, it did not undertake its own analysis of 
the State Department’s role in cases brought against foreign 
individuals, nor did the Court need to define that role in order to 
conclude that the FSIA was not intended to supplant it.35 If the 
Supreme Court meant to endorse absolute executive deference, it 
could easily have done so. Instead, it referred throughout its opinion 
to the “common law” and made no mention of “principles adopted by 
the Executive Branch,” despite having been urged by the United 
States to do so. The precise role of the Executive post-Samantar thus 
remains a matter of dispute, as evidenced by recent briefing on 
remand in Samantar itself.36 
 I have taken issue elsewhere with the claim that there is a 
consistent historical practice of absolute deference to the Executive on 
                                                                                                                      
 31. Id. at 2290. 
 32. United States Samantar Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 8. 
 33. Koh, supra note 25.  
 34. Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2291. 
 35. Id. at 2284–85. 
 36. The pleadings on remand are available at Pleadings: Yousuf v. Samantar, 
CENTER FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type& 
type=142#U.S.%20District%20Court%20for%20the%20Eastern%20District%20of%20Vi
rginia%20%28On%20Remand%29 (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).  
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questions of individual conduct-based immunity.37 Even if there were 
such a practice, it is unlikely that the “common law” is reducible to it. 
Yet regardless of the degree of deference owed to executive 
suggestions, the question remains of what principles ought to govern 
conduct-based immunity—whether these principles are articulated 
and applied by the Executive, by courts, or by some combination of 
both. The rest of this Part identifies three such principles. 
A. Personal Responsibility 
 Under both international law and U.S. law, individuals may be 
held personally responsible for acts performed under color of foreign 
law.38 Simply put, personal responsibility and state responsibility are 
not mutually exclusive. The predicate for individual, conduct-based 
immunity is thus not simply whether the alleged conduct is 
attributable to the foreign state.39 If it were, then domestic criminal 
prosecutions for international crimes committed by foreign officials 
would also be barred by immunity, because many such crimes are 
also attributable to the foreign state. 
 Those who advocate a zero-sum account of the relationship 
between personal responsibility and state responsibility sometimes 
cite a statement by the Appeals Chamber of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).40 The Appeals 
Chamber found that the ICTY does not have the authority to issue 
subpoenas for the production of documents to current government 
officials in their official capacity, because it lacks the power to impose 
sanctions on states themselves in the event of noncompliance, given its 
                                                                                                                      
 37. See Keitner, Common Law, supra note 4, at 72 (describing the scant 
authority regarding deference to the Executive on questions of conduct-based 
immunity); see also Chimène I. Keitner, The Lost History of Foreign Official Immunity, 
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (exploring the Executive’s own understanding of 
constitutional limitations on its ability to intervene in civil suits during the Founding 
Era). 
 38. For example, the crime of torture requires action under color of law. See 
Torture Convention Implementation Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006). 
 39. Article 7 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility attributes officials’ ultra vires conduct to the state, but Article 58 makes 
clear that the provisions on attribution “are without prejudice to any question of the 
individual responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of a 
State.” Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, 
Annex, arts. 7, 58, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) (Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility). 
 40. See, e.g., United States Matar Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 23. 
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limited mandate.41 In finding the tribunal powerless to issue this type 
of subpoena, the Appeals Chamber reasoned:  
Such [current] officials are mere instruments of a State and their 
official action can only be attributed to the State. They cannot be the 
subject of sanctions or penalties for conduct that is not private but 
undertaken on behalf of a State. In other words, State officials cannot 
suffer the consequences of wrongful acts which are not attributable to 
them personally but to the State on whose behalf they act: they enjoy 
so-called “functional immunity.”42 
This makes sense in the context of a discussion of a current official’s 
compliance or noncompliance with a request to produce documents on 
behalf of the state. However, it does not make sense in other contexts. 
As the ICTY emphasized in the same opinion, “Those responsible for 
[conduct within the tribunal’s jurisdiction] cannot invoke immunity 
from national or international jurisdiction even if they perpetrated 
such crimes while acting in their official capacity,” just as spies 
“although acting as State organs, may be held personally accountable 
for their wrongdoing.”43 Accordingly, state responsibility does not 
automatically confer individual immunity from the jurisdiction of 
international or domestic courts.  
 The United States has recognized the compatibility of state 
action with personal responsibility in at least some cases. For 
example, in a statement that pre-dates Samantar the United States 
argued that: “if the defendant were correct that color of law can 
simply be equated with sovereignty and that the FSIA is applicable in 
all such cases, the torture statute would be rendered meaningless. 
Such a result must be rejected.”44 In that case, which involved the 
prosecution of Roy Belfast Jr. (a/k/a “Chuckie” Taylor) for torture in 
Liberia, the Court agreed with the U.S. government that the 
defendant could both act “in an official capacity” and still be held 
personally responsible for his conduct by a U.S. court.45 Just as 
personal responsibility does not necessarily equal a lack of immunity 
                                                                                                                      
 41. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108, Judgment on the Request 
of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of the Trial Chamber of 18 July 
1997, ¶ 38 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. ¶ 41; see also Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (defining “spies”); Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295 (Annex 
to the Hague Convention No. IV). 
 44. United States’ Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 
the Indictment, United States v. Emmanuel, No. 06-20758-CR (S.D. Fla. July 5, 2007), 
at *1.  
 45. See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 793, 808 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The 
Senate Executive Committee charged with evaluating the CAT aptly explained that 
there is no distinction between the meaning of the phrases ‘under the color of law’ 
[used in the 28 U.S.C. § 2340] and in ‘an official capacity’ [used in CAT].”). 
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(since immunity can depend on other factors), state responsibility 
does not automatically entail individual immunity, and should not be 
treated as though it does.  
B. Presence 
 Individuals who enter U.S. territory do so with the consent of the 
United States, and become subject to the personal jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts.46 Even accredited diplomats can be expelled by the United 
States if they engage in unlawful conduct, and they can lose their 
status-based immunity if they remain in the United States beyond a 
specified grace period.47 
 Jurisdictional immunities accorded current or former foreign 
officials are therefore an exception to the baseline principle of plenary 
jurisdiction based on territorial presence.48 When proceedings are 
brought against a defendant who is physically present within the 
forum state (as opposed to a defendant who remains outside the 
jurisdiction), the principle of plenary territorial jurisdiction comes 
into play. The FSIA declines to recognize the immunity of the state 
itself when tortious or criminal conduct takes place within U.S. 
territory.49 Just as the location of the acts plays a role in determining 
whether the exercise of the forum state’s jurisdiction to prescribe, 
adjudicate, and enforce would be reasonable, so too does the location 
of the defendant. 
 In its submission to the district court on remand in Samantar, 
the United States emphasized that “[b]asic principles of 
sovereignty . . . provide that a state generally has a right to exercise 
jurisdiction over its residents.”50 The United States further opined 
that “U.S. residents like Samantar who enjoy the protections of U.S. 
law ordinarily should be subject to the jurisdiction of our courts, 
                                                                                                                      
 46. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 
(1812) (discussing extent of a nation’s jurisdiction “within its own territory”). 
 47. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 19, art. 9 
(stating that a receiving state may declare a member of the diplomatic staff to be 
unacceptable); id. arts. 37(2)–(3), 38(1) (describing the extent of individual 
immunities). 
 48. For further discussion of the territorial principle, see Chimène I. Keitner, 
Foreign Official Immunity and the “Baseline” Problem, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011). 
 49. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2006) (amended 2008) (denying immunity 
where “damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or 
damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious 
act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state 
while acting within the scope of his office or employment . . . .”). 
 50. Statement of Interest of the United States at 9, Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 
1:04cv1360 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2007) (citing The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 
at 136). 
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particularly when sued by U.S. residents.”51 Due consideration of the 
role of a defendant’s presence within U.S. territory also serves the 
policy goal of ensuring that victims who have fled human rights 
abuses in their countries of origin will not be compelled to live side-
by-side with their former abusers, by deterring potential defendants 
from traveling to, and especially taking up residence in, the United 
States.52 
C. Penalties 
 There is a tendency to differentiate axiomatically between 
criminal and civil proceedings for immunity purposes, and to find 
civil immunity even where criminal immunity would not exist.53 
Where this result is not compelled by statute, it does not make sense.  
If anything, one might expect criminal immunity to be more robust, 
rather than less robust, than civil immunity, because the potential 
consequences of criminal liability are more severe. For example, the 
U.S. government expressed concern in its submission in Matar v. 
Dichter that: “Even more worrisome, foreign criminal courts might 
look to U.S. civil immunity rules in an effort to justify assertions of 
jurisdiction over U.S. officials.”54 That said, because U.S. government 
attorneys serve as gatekeepers in the criminal context, potential 
defendants might view the possibility of being held civilly liable as 
less predictable and, thus, more objectionable than the possibility of 
being prosecuted in U.S. courts. 
 Governmental control over criminal prosecutions has led others 
to draw a distinction between criminal and civil immunity. For 
example, at least one circuit court has taken the position that 
initiating a prosecution amounts to a denial of immunity.55 This 
                                                                                                                      
 51. Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 50, at 7. 
 52. This policy is also reflected in U.S. asylum laws, which deny political 
asylum in the United States to former persecutors. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) 
(defining “refugee” to exclude persecutors); id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (denying asylum status 
to persecutors); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (granting Attorney General power to deport 
persecutors). 
 53. For example, in an English case decided after this symposium was 
convened, the High Court stated in dicta that “[a]ll State officials enjoy immunity 
ratione materiae for their official acts from the civil jurisdiction of the courts of other 
States,” but found that there was no such immunity from criminal jurisdiction. See 
Khurts Bat v. Investigating Judge, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 2029, [71], [101] (Eng.) 
(citing United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property, G.A. Res. 59/38, Annex, art 1(b)(iv), U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38 (Dec. 16, 2004), 
which is not yet in force and has not been signed or ratified by the United States, for 
support). 
 54. United States Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 1, at 22 n.20. 
 55. See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(interpreting prosecution by the Executive Branch as a “clear sentiment” that 
immunity should be denied). 
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seems somewhat problematic, particularly if, for example, the United 
States sought to prosecute a recognized, sitting head of state who is 
entitled to status-based immunity under customary international 
law. Moreover, it is not clear that prosecutorial discretion is the best 
form of executive gatekeeping where foreign official defendants are 
concerned. As former Acting State Department Legal Adviser Michael 
Matheson has observed, “[T]he fact is that the process of indictments 
in the U.S. system is not well integrated with foreign policy 
concerns.”56 The myth of a unitary and coordinated Executive seems 
an insufficient reason to differentiate between civil and criminal 
proceedings for immunity purposes. 
 In his opinion in Jones v. Saudi Arabia—a challenge to which is 
currently pending before the European Court of Human Rights—Lord 
Bingham of the UK House of Lords (now the UK Supreme Court) 
distinguished civil from criminal proceedings on the grounds that a 
state’s interests are affected by civil proceedings, but not by criminal 
proceedings.57 This rationale also seems unpersuasive. If the state is 
the real party in interest, then the individual might not be the proper 
defendant in a civil suit. However, the state is not always the real 
party in interest. Where the state’s interests are affected in some 
symbolic or indirect way, this is surely no different in a civil 
proceeding than it is in a criminal case. In fact, the potential offense 
to the foreign state seems greater in the criminal context, at least 
where U.S. courts are involved, because only government authorities 
can initiate criminal proceedings. Thus, from a diplomatic 
perspective, responsibility for the proceedings cannot be deflected 
onto private parties or onto the judicial branch. 
 Perhaps most puzzling, proponents of blanket civil immunity 
appear to acknowledge that criminal immunity is unwarranted in 
certain cases.58 If there is no immunity from criminal proceedings, 
then it is not clear as a doctrinal matter why there would 
nevertheless be immunity from civil proceedings for the same 
conduct.59 
                                                                                                                      
 56. MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN 
TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT 
LEGAL ADVISER 94  (2010). 
 57. See Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, [2006] 
UKHL 26, [31], [2007] 1 A.C. 270 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (“A state is not 
criminally responsible in international or English law”; however, “a civil action . . . does 
indirectly implead the state”). The UK court of appeal had found that the foreign state 
was no more “impleaded” by civil proceedings for torture than by criminal proceedings 
for the same conduct. See Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1394, [2005] Q.B. 699 [75]–[76], [127]–[28] (Eng.). 
 58. See sources cited supra note 9. 
 59. The only remaining basis for distinction, which I have criticized elsewhere, 
is the assumption that there is a “baseline” of immunity from both civil and criminal 
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III. FACTORS TO CONSIDER 
 The principles canvassed above, and the immunity practices of 
the United States, suggest that it can be useful to ask the following 
questions in order to determine whether or not a particular individual 
who is not covered by an existing treaty or statute is entitled to 
conduct-based immunity as a matter of common law: 
 1.  Has the foreign government, recognized as such by the U.S. 
Department of State, requested immunity? If the answer is “no,” or if 
the foreign state has waived immunity, then the consensus appears to 
be that there should be no immunity, because immunity is for the 
benefit of the state, not the individual.60 Although this appears to 
leave former officials at the “mercy” of subsequent domestic regime 
changes, the same is true of the possibility that such officials could 
face legal proceedings in their own country’s courts for wrongdoings 
committed by a prior regime. 
 As a procedural matter, a request for immunity should first be 
addressed to the State Department.61 That said, it is foreseeable that 
certain foreign governments will make representations to courts 
directly, in which case courts will have to ascertain whether the 
government is “recognized” by the United States. Either way, the 
burden should be on the defendant to ensure that his or her 
government is made aware of the legal proceedings, and intervenes in 
a timely fashion. 
 If the foreign government has requested immunity, then courts 
should go on to ask: 
 2.  Is the alleged conduct attributable to the foreign state? If the 
answer is “no,” then there should be no conduct-based immunity from 
either criminal or civil proceedings. Even proponents of a robust form 
of immunity do not suggest that there ought to be immunity where 
the state bears no responsibility for the alleged conduct, because 
immunity is for the benefit of the state.62 
 3. If the alleged conduct is attributable to the foreign state, was 
it performed with actual (as opposed to apparent, or no) authority? 
This might be a difficult question to answer at the margins, but it will 
                                                                                                                      
proceedings, and that this immunity has been eroded solely in the case of criminal 
proceedings. See Keitner, supra note 48. There would, however, be an incongruity in 
allowing criminal jurisdiction while precluding civil jurisdiction for the same claims. 
 60. Cf. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 
Reports 3, 21–22, 25–26 (Feb. 14) (explaining that immunities are not granted for 
personal benefit of the diplomatic official, and that the sending state may waive that 
immunity in a foreign court). 
 61. This became the established practice in suits involving foreign ships. See 
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284 (2010) (citing Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 
U.S. 578, 581 (1943)). 
 62. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 28, art 43(1); 
supra text accompanying note 28.   
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inevitably involve, to a certain extent, taking a foreign state’s 
representations about the individual’s scope of authority at face 
value. If the conduct was not performed with actual authority, or was 
ultra vires, then there should be no conduct-based immunity from 
either criminal or civil proceedings, even if the conduct is also 
attributable to the state.63 Immunity should only protect exercises of 
state authority that the foreign state embraces as such. 
 In my view, only if the answer to each of these three questions is 
“yes” does the question of immunity become tricky: i.e., when a 
recognized foreign government has requested immunity, the conduct 
is attributable to the foreign state, and the conduct was performed 
with actual authority. Notably, reasoning about immunity as a 
matter of “common law” under these conditions does not turn on 
whether the proceedings are civil or criminal in nature.64 From a U.S. 
perspective, reciprocity concerns are the same—and might even be 
heightened—if a current or former U.S. official is subjected to foreign 
criminal proceedings, as opposed to proceedings that could only result 
in the award of money damages.65 
 Two additional factors seem especially relevant to the decision of 
whether to recognize immunity in these difficult cases: 
 4. Was the defendant served or arrested while within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States? Although immunity is for 
the benefit of the foreign state rather than the individual, the United 
States maintains plenary jurisdiction over individuals who have 
entered its territory.66 The more sustained the individual’s presence 
within U.S. territory, the stronger the United States’ claim to exercise 
territorial jurisdiction might appear. Technically speaking, however, 
physical presence of any duration will suffice.67 
 Individuals who are not entitled to status-based immunity might 
need to think twice before entering the United States if they have 
                                                                                                                      
 63. The non-binding Draft Articles on State Responsibility do not compel a 
different result. See G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 39, art. 7 (attributing state officials’ 
ultra vires conduct to the state so long as the person or entity acts in an official 
capacity); id. art. 58 (indicating that attribution to the state is “without prejudice” to 
the question of individual responsibility). 
 64. See supra Part II.C. 
 65. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 66. See Keitner, supra note 48, at 9 (“The territorial theory . . . starts with a 
baseline of plenary jurisdiction by the forum state over its territory and individuals 
present on that territory . . . .”); supra text accompanying note 48. 
 67. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 608, 628 (1990) (finding 
that personal jurisdiction based upon personal service of a summons and complaint on 
an individual physically present within a state in the United States comports with due 
process requirements); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246, 248 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding 
personal jurisdiction over defendant who was served during a brief visit to the United 
States). 
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previously engaged in illegal conduct. Conversely, if an individual 
defendant was not served or arrested within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States, then the United States’ plenary 
jurisdiction over its own territory does not serve as a counterweight 
to a foreign state’s claim to conduct-based immunity for its agent, 
assuming the alleged conduct occurred overseas. As a practical 
matter, it is also unlikely that a U.S. court would have personal 
jurisdiction over the absent defendant in such a case.  
 5. Has Congress attached legal consequences to the alleged 
conduct? Congress has criminalized conduct including torture, war 
crimes, genocide, use of child soldiers, aircraft hijacking, and child 
sex trafficking, even when this conduct occurs outside U.S. 
territory.68 Some of this conduct, including torture and extrajudicial 
killing, can also entail civil liability under U.S. law.69 These statutes, 
although they do not explicitly abrogate conduct-based immunity, 
embody a political determination that such conduct is harmful and 
should be discouraged, wherever it occurs.70 Courts may justifiably 
look to such statutes in weighing whether or not to recognize conduct-
based immunity in a particular case. 
 My current view is that if the defendant was served or arrested 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and Congress 
has attached legal consequences to the alleged conduct, then there 
should be a presumption of no conduct-based immunity. This 
formulation certainly does not answer all possible questions, but the 
public and clear articulation of these factors would at least serve to 
put individuals on notice about the potential legal consequences of 
travel to the United States.  
 An alternative approach is to grant blanket immunity for all 
conduct attributable to the state, absent a waiver from the foreign 
state. In my view, this would excessively restrict the jurisdiction of 
U.S. courts. At the other end of the spectrum, one could deny conduct-
based immunity for all congressionally proscribed conduct, and 
perhaps for all internationally unlawful conduct as well. In my view, 
this would create excessive legal exposure, particularly in light of 
reciprocity concerns. In the middle of the spectrum, one could grant 
immunity to agents of our strategic allies and trading partners, and 
                                                                                                                      
 68. Genocide Accountability Act of 2007, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d) (2006); Torture 
Convention Implementation Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2006); War Crimes 
Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006); Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 
U.S.C. § 2442 (2006).  
 69. Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006). 
 70. Certain “violations of the law of nations” also carry the potential for civil 
liability under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006), although the specific 
types of conduct that entail such liability have thus far been subject to judicial, rather 
than legislative, specification. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) 
(discussing criteria used by courts for analyzing claims under this statute). 
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deny it to others. This concept is reflected to a certain extent in the 
state sponsors of terrorism exception to the FSIA, which exposes 
those states to greater legal liability because of purely political 
considerations.71 However, such an uneven application of immunity 
would remove any pretense of impartiality in the application of 
neutral principles, and would also undermine our ability to argue for 
immunity based on reciprocity when U.S. officials face legal 
proceedings in inhospitable fora. Difficult as it might be, we should 
strive to find a principled middle ground, and to give potential 
defendants notice about the criteria that will be applied to determine 
whether immunity is likely to be available if they enter the United 
States. 
                                                                                                                      
 71. See Terrorism Exception to the Jurisdictional Immunity of a Foreign State, 
28 U.S.C. § 1605(A) (2006) (creating exception for state sponsors of terrorism).  
